注：
前两篇更像自己的笔记，自己翻阅的时候发现挺乱的，也找不到原文怎么说的，为了日后方便自己与有缘人回溯原文，后续的笔记还是直接贴巴菲特的原话好了：
原英文（斜体）
然后我在 AI 翻译的基础上一个字一个字的做了一些校验和更正：
中文（正常文字）
如果有的话，再加一些自己的理解：
标红处理
虽然是笨办法，但发现在这个过程中，自己对巴菲特又有了新的认识，巴菲特的很多话今天依旧适用，不敢相信那是 1998 年的演讲。
Question: You were rumored to be one of the rescue buyers of Long Term Capital, what was the play there, what did you see?
提问：传闻您是长期资本管理公司（LTCM）的救助买家之一，当时的局势是怎样的？您从中看到了什么？
The Fortune Magazine that has Rupert Murdoch on the cover. It tells the whole story of our involvement; it is kind of an interesting story. I got the really serious call about LTCM on a Friday afternoon that things were getting serious. I know those people most of them pretty well--most of them at Salomon when I was there. And the place was imploding and the FED was sending people up that weekend. Between that Friday and the following Wed. when the NY Fed, in effect, orchestrated a rescue effort but without any Federal money involved. I was quite active but I was having a terrible time reaching anybody.
那期封面人物是鲁伯特·默多克的《财富》杂志详细讲述了我们参与的全过程；这其实是个挺有意思的故事。我是在一个周五下午接到关于长期资本管理公司（LTCM）情况危急的正式电话的。我非常了解那里的那帮人——他们中的大多数人在我在所罗门兄弟公司任职期间就认识了。当时那家公司正在内部爆炸，美联储那个周末正派人过去处理。在那个周五到接下来的周三之间，纽约联储实际上精心策划了一场救援行动，但没有动用任何联邦资金。那期间我表现得非常积极，但苦于一直很难联系上相关负责人。
We put in a bid on Wednesday morning. I talked to Bill McDonough at the NY Fed. We made a bid for 250 million for the net assets but we would have put in 3 and 3/4 billion on top of that. $3 billion from Berkshire, $700 mil. from AIG and $300 million. from Goldman Sachs. And we submitted that but we put a very short time limit on that because when you are bidding on 100 billion worth of securities that are moving around, you don't want to leave a fixed price bid out there for very long.
我们在周三早上提交了一份报价。我和纽约联储的比尔·麦克多诺谈过。我们出资 2.5 亿美元收购其净资产，但除此之外，我们还会再投入 37.5 亿美元。其中 30 亿美元来自伯克希尔，7 亿美元来自 AIG，3 亿美元来自高盛。我们提交了这份标书，但给出的时限非常短，因为当你针对价值 1000 亿美元且波动剧烈的证券进行报价时，你不会希望让一个固定价格的标单在外面挂太久。
In the end the bankers made the deal, but it was an interesting period. The whole LTCM is really fascinating because if you take Larry Hillenbrand, Eric Rosenfeld, John Meriwether and the two Nobel prize winners. If you take the 16 of them, they have about as high an IQ as any 16 people working together in one business in the country, including Microsoft. An incredible amount of intellect in one room. Now you combine that with the fact that those people had extensive experience in the field they were operating in. These were not a bunch of guys who had made their money selling men’s clothing and all of a sudden went into the securities business. They had in aggregate, the 16, had 300 or 400 years of experience doing exactly what they were doing and then you throw in the third factor that most of them had most of their very substantial net worth’s in the businesses. Hundreds and hundreds of millions of their own money up (at risk), super high intellect and working in a field that they knew. Essentially they went broke. That to me is absolutely fascinating.
最终是银行家们达成了交易，但那是一段非常有趣的时期。整个 LTCM 事件真的引人入胜，因为如果你看拉里·希伦布兰德（Larry Hillenbrand）、埃里克·罗森菲尔德（Eric Rosenfeld）、约翰·麦瑞威瑟（John Meriwether）以及那两位诺贝尔奖得主。如果你把这 16 个人聚在一起，他们的智商之高，恐怕全美国任何一家公司（包括微软在内）找出的 16 人组合都难出其右。那是极高智慧的汇聚（智商顶配）。此外，还要考虑到这些人都在其操作领域拥有极其丰富的经验。他们可不是一群靠卖男装发家后突然闯进证券行业的门外汉。这 16 个人在他们所从事的领域里，累计拥有 300-400 年的经验。再加上第三个因素：他们中大多数人都把自己绝大部分的身家都投在了这家公司里。数以亿计的个人资产（面临风险），超群的智力，以及在自己精通的领域工作。结果，他们几乎倾家荡产（再次用教科书级别的例子验证：一个成功的投资者，和智商的关系不大）。这对我来说简直太有意思了。
If I ever write a book it will be called, Why Smart People Do Dumb Things. My partner says it should be autobiographical. But this might be an interesting illustration. They are perfectly decent guys. I respect them and they helped me out when I had problems at Salomon. They are not bad people at all.
如果我以后写一本书，书名就叫《为什么聪明人会做蠢事》。我的合伙人（查理·芒格）说这书应该写成自传（巴芒式互相拆台，巴菲特谦虚道自己也做了不少蠢事）。但这（LTCM 事件）确实是一个有趣的案例。他们都是非常好的人。我尊敬他们，而且当我在所罗门公司遇到麻烦时，他们还曾帮过我。他们绝不是什么坏人。
But to make money they didn’t have and didn’t need, they risked what they did have and what they did need. That is just plain foolish; it doesn’t matter what your IQ is. If you risk something that is important to you for something that is unimportant to you it just doesn’t make sense. I don’t care if the odds you succeed are 99 to 1 or 1000 to 1 that you succeed. If you hand me a gun with a million chambers with one bullet in a chamber and put it up to your temple and I am paid to pull the trigger, it doesn’t matter how much I would be paid. I would not pull the trigger. You can name any sum you want, but it doesn’t do anything for me on the upside and I think the downside is fairly clear. Yet people do it financially very much without thinking.
但是，为了赚那些他们并不拥有、也并不需要的钱，他们却拿自己已经拥有且确实需要的东西去冒险。这简直就是愚蠢；无论你的智商有多高都一样。如果你为了对自己不重要的东西，去赌对自己重要的东西，这根本说不通。不管你成功的概率是 99 比 1 还是 1000 比 1，我都不在乎。如果你递给我一把有一百万个弹仓的左轮手枪，里面只装了一颗子弹，然后指着你自己的太阳穴，让我扣动扳机换取报酬，那么不管报酬有多少，我都不会扣动扳机（投资是概率，同时失败也只需要一次）。你可以开出任何你想要的金额，但这笔钱即便赚到了对我也没有任何实质意义，而一旦失败（后果）则是显而易见的。然而，人们在财务上却经常不加思索地做出这种事。
There was a lousy book with a great title written by Walter Gutman—You Only Have to Get Rich Once. Now that seems pretty fundamental. If you have $100 million at the beginning of the year and you will make 10% if you are unleveraged and 20% if you are leveraged 99 times out of a 100, what difference if at the end of the year, you have $110 million or $120 million? It makes no difference. If you die at the end of the year, the guy who makes up the story may make a typo, he may have said 110 even though you had a 120. You have gained nothing at all. It makes absolutely no difference. It makes no difference to your family or anybody else.
有一本写得很烂但书名起得极好的书，作者是沃尔特·古特曼（Walter Gutman），书名叫《你只需要富一次》（You Only Have to Get Rich Once）。这看起来是一个非常基本的道理。如果你年初有 1 亿美元，在不加杠杆的情况下能赚 10%，而在加了杠杆的情况下，即便 100 次中有 99 次能赚 20%，那么到年底你是拥有 1.1 亿美元还是 1.2 亿美元，又有什么区别呢？根本没有区别。如果你在年底去世，写报道的人可能会打错字，即便你赚到了 1.2 亿，他也可能写成 1.1 亿。你根本没有任何实质性的获得。这完全没有任何区别，对你的家人或其他任何人来说也是如此。
The downside, especially if you are managing other people’s money, is not only losing all your money, but it is disgrace, humiliation and facing friends whose money you have lost. Yet 16 guys with very high IQs entered into that game. I think it is madness. It is produced by an over reliance to some extent on things. Those guys would tell me back at Salomon; a six Sigma event wouldn’t touch us. But they were wrong. History does not tell you of future things happening. They had a great reliance on mathematics. They thought that the Beta of the stock told you something about the risk of the stock. It doesn’t tell you a damn thing about the risk of the stock in my view.
这种风险的代价，尤其是当你管理他人的资金时，不仅是输光所有的钱，还有耻辱、羞愧以及无颜面对那些被你赔光了钱的朋友。然而，16个高智商的天才竟然卷入了这种博弈。我认为这是疯狂的。这在某种程度上是由于过度依赖某些东西造成的。当初在所罗门公司时，那些人曾告诉我：6 Sigma 事件（极小概率事件）伤不到我们。但他们错了。历史并不能预告未来。他们过于依赖数学（数学不会体现出公司真实的财务风险），认为股票的贝塔系数（Beta）能反映股票的风险。在我看来，贝塔系数对衡量股票风险没有半点用处。
Sigma’s do not tell you about the risk of going broke in my view and maybe now in their view too. But I don’t like to use them as an example. The same thing in a different way could happen to any of us, where we really have a blind spot about something that is crucial, because we know a whole lot of something else. It is like Henry Kauffman said, “The ones who are going broke in this situation are of two types, the ones who know nothing and the ones who know everything.” It is sad in a way.
在我看来，Sigma（标准差）并不能告诉你破产的风险，也许现在他们也这么想了。但我并不想仅仅把他们当作一个例子。同样的事情可能会以不同的方式发生在任何人的身上——我们可能会因为在某些领域懂得太多，而对另一个至关重要的领域产生盲点。正如亨利·考夫曼（Henry Kauffman）所说：“在这种情况下，会破产的人分为两类：一类是对此一无所知的人，另一类是对此无所不知的人。”从某种角度来看，这挺悲哀的。
I urge you. We basically never borrow money. I never borrowed money even when I had $10,000 basically, what difference did it make. I was having fun as I went along it didn’t matter whether I had $10,000 or $100,000 or $1,000,000 unless I had a medical emergency come along. I was going to do the same things when I had a little bit of money as when I had a lot of money. If you think of the difference between me and you, we wear the same clothes basically (SunTrust gives me mine), we eat similar food—we all go to McDonald’s or better yet, Dairy Queen, and we live in a house that is warm in winter and cool in summer. We watch the Nebraska (football) game on big screen TV. You see it the same way I see it. We do everything the same—our lives are not that different. The only thing we do is we travel differently. What can I do that you can’t do?
我极力奉劝各位。我们基本上从不借钱。即使在我只有 1 万美元的时候，我基本上也不借钱，因为那能有什么区别呢？我这一路走来都乐在其中，除非遇到医疗紧急状况，否则我有 1 万、10 万还是 100 万美元都无关紧要。钱少的时候我做的事情，和钱多的时候是一样的。如果你想想我跟你们之间的区别，我们穿的衣服基本一样（我的衣服是 SunTrust 银行送的），吃的食物也差不多——我们都去麦当劳，或者更棒的是去冰雪皇后（Dairy Queen），我们住的房子也是冬暖夏凉。我们在大屏幕电视上看内布拉斯加队的橄榄球赛。你们看到的画面和我看到的一模一样。我们做的一切都一样——我们的生活并没有那么大的差别。唯一不同的只是我们的出行方式。有什么是我能做而你们做不到的吗（选择价投就要接受慢慢变富）？
I get to work in a job that I love, but I have always worked at a job that I loved. I loved it just as much when I thought it was a big deal to make $1,000. I urge you to work in jobs that you love. I think you are out of your mind if you keep taking jobs that you don’t like because you think it will look good on your resume. I was with a fellow at Harvard the other day who was taking me over to talk. He was 28 and he was telling me all that he had done in life, which was terrific. And then I said, “What will you do next?”“Well,” he said, “Maybe after I get my MBA I will go to work for a consulting firm because it will look good on my resume.” I said, “Look, you are 28 and you have been doing all these things, you have a resume 10 times than anybody I have ever seen. Isn’t that a little like saving up sex for your old age?
我现在从事着一份我 热爱的工作，但我一直以来从事的都是我热爱的工作。即便是在我觉得赚到 1000 美元就是件了不起的大事时，我也同样热爱它。我敦促你们去从事自己热爱的工作。如果你为了让简历好看而不断接受自己不喜欢的工作，我认为你一定是疯了。前几天我正和哈佛的一个小伙子在一起，他正带我去演讲。他 28 岁，向我讲述了他经历过的一切，非常了不起。然后我问：“你下一步打算做什么？”他说：“嗯，也许拿到 MBA 学位后我会去一家咨询公司工作，因为这会让我的简历更好看。”我说：“听着，你才 28 岁，已经做了这么多事情，你的简历比我见过任何人的都要精彩十倍。你现在的做法，不觉得有点像把性生活攒到晚年再用吗 ？”
There comes a time when you ought to start doing what you want. Take a job that you love. You will jump out of bed in the morning. When I first got out of Columbia Business School, I wanted to go to work for Graham immediately for nothing. He thought I was over-priced. But I kept pestering him. I sold securities for three years and I kept writing him and finally I went to work for him for a couple of years. It was a great experience. But I always worked in a job that I loved doing. You really should take a job that if you were independently wealthy that would be the job you would take. You will learn something, you will be excited about, and you will jump out of bed. You can’t miss. You may try something else later on, but you will get way more out of it and I don’t care what the starting salary is.
你总要到了该开始做自己想做的事情的时候。找一份你热爱的工作吧。这样你每天早晨都会从床上弹起来。当我刚从哥伦比亚商学院毕业时，我想立刻为格雷厄姆工作，甚至不要薪水。他觉得我开价太高了（笔者注：幽默说法，意指格雷厄姆认为即便不要钱也不值）。但我一直缠着他。我做了三年的证券销售，并不断给他写信，最终我为他工作了几年。那是一段伟大的经历。但我始终从事着自己热爱的工作。你真的应该选择一份这样的工作——即便是你已经财富自由了，你依然会选择这份工作。你会学到东西，你会感到兴奋，你会每天动力十足地起床。你绝不会失败。以后你也许会尝试别的事情，但现在这样做你会受益匪浅，而且我根本不在乎起薪是多少。
When you get out of here take a job you love, not a job you think will look good on your resume. You ought to find something you like. If you think you will be happier getting 2x instead of 1x, you are probably making a mistake. You will get in trouble if you think making 10x or 20x will make you happier because then you will borrow money when you shouldn’t or cut corners on things. It just doesn’t make sense and you won’t like it when you look back.
当你们离开校园时，找一份你热爱的工作，而不是一份你认为能让简历漂亮的工作。你应该找点自己真正喜欢的事情。如果你认为赚两倍的钱会比赚一倍更快乐，你可能犯了个错误。如果你觉得赚 10 倍或 20 倍的钱才会让你更快乐，那你就会陷入麻烦——因为那时你会去借不该借的钱，或者在某些事情上投机取巧。这根本没有意义，而且当你回首往事时，你绝不会喜欢那样的自己。
